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BY: VIVEK KOTHARI
Autobots, Decepticons, and Panopticons:
The Transformative Nature of GPS Technology 
and the Fourth Amendment 
I. INTRODUCTION
A getaway car squeals around a street corner on three wheels, followed closely by at least two police cruisers. Instead of giving hot pursuit, the police slow down slightly and shoot a dart from the ra-
diator of their cruiser that embeds itself into the getaway car. 
The police then retreat. Unbeknownst to the alleged criminals, 
their car has been transformed into a homing device, allowing 
law enforcement to track their movements remotely and with-
out the fuss of a high profile, potentially 
dangerous high-speed car chase. Law 
enforcement can simply arrive at the 
vehicle’s destination and apprehend any 
complicit individuals.
One would only be half wrong to 
assume that this sequence of events is 
the product of Tinseltown. The Los An-
geles Police Department recently outfit-
ted some of their cruisers with Global 
Positioning System (“GPS”) darts in 
order to eliminate high-speed chases 
and the casualties and property dam-
age they entail.1 The echoes of George 
Orwell’s Big Brother are unmistakable. 
This is the most creative and experimen-
tal, application of a GPS device in law 
enforcement.2
In a more common application of 
GPS technology, law enforcement at-
taches a GPS device to a vehicle when it is parked in a public 
space.3 Officers do so without the owner’s knowledge and, more 
importantly, without a warrant from a “neutral and detached 
magistrate.”4 These devices enable perfect tracking twenty-four 
hours a day, for weeks, months, or years at a time at only a 
nominal cost. Surreptitiously, your participation in a political 
rally is noted; your trip to the abortion clinic, recorded; your 
weekly visits to the psychiatrist, revealed.
Indeed, by using multiple devices against one target, the 
police can easily compile a comprehensive dossier regarding 
one’s individual choices.5 Consequently, they can learn not only 
where you are and where you will be, but also what you have 
taken with you. The devices cost very little both to purchase and 
to monitor, enabling law enforcement to track the movements 
of large groups of people. Law enforcement can then mine that 
data to create a vivid, detailed digest of your life and record of 
acquaintances. Currently, only a lack of imagination restrains 
law enforcement’s application of this technology. As presently 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Constitution does not 
limit the Government’s ability to place a GPS device on your 
person, vehicle, running shoes, backpack, or purse.
The Fourth Amendment provides 
the most direct constitutional protec-
tion for individual privacy in the face 
of unprecedented government intrusion 
into previously personal and sacrosanct 
zones.6 The Fourth Amendment pro-
tects privacy, property, and liberty by 
prohibiting “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” of “persons, houses, papers, 
and effects,”7 but federal courts have 
been reluctant to extend its protections 
to prohibit the use of GPS devices. It 
is no surprise then that the protections 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment lag 
behind advancements in technology.
The Fourth Amendment has al-
ways played the proverbial tortoise to 
technology’s hare. Both began at the 
starting line as “bricks and mortar” 
concepts, grounded in the real world. 
Technology quickly bounded ahead to an early lead, first with 
the invention of the telegraph and telephone and then with in-
ternet and satellite technology, creating not only virtual worlds, 
but also permitting virtual access to the real world. Meanwhile, 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
plods along, slowly assessing the changes that are wrought by 
technology and, just as surely, creating doctrine to address the 
intersection of evolving technology and the law.8
The Fourth Amendment protects privacy, yet its relevance 
with respect to emerging technologies is debated, doubted, 
and circumscribed. On one hand, some assert that the Fourth 
Amendment has lost all relevance in the modern world.9 Conse-
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quently, critics argue that only legislative remedies can protect 
privacy against increasingly efficient methods of government 
surveillance.10 On the other hand, there are those who argue that 
the current doctrine takes a simplistic, binary, and ultimately 
untenable view of privacy effectively rendering the Fourth 
Amendment ineffective as a guarantor of privacy.11 There is 
no reason to suggest, however, that the concept of “privacy 
is dead,”12 or that technology has somehow rendered Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections obsolete.13 New technologies 
allow for, but certainly do not require, enhanced and pervasive 
government surveillance. Indeed, there are a host of legitimate, 
productive, and even frivolous uses of GPS technology.14 Yet 
in applying the protections of the Fourth Amendment to cases 
of government surveillance, commentators and the Court en-
gage in discussion of only half of the Amendment – the search 
prong.15
Ostensibly, the Fourth Amendment protects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures equally, but the vast major-
ity of court decisions and scholarly writing concerning the 
Fourth Amendment revolves around those issues pertaining to 
searches. Because most seizures follow a search, the seizure 
prong of the Amendment has received little scholarly or judicial 
recognition.16 This is particularly true of the law and scholar-
ship surrounding the Fourth Amendment’s treatment of emerg-
ing technologies.17
The use of GPS devices confounds this disparity. Law en-
forcement is increasingly turning to GPS surveillance as a fun-
damental part of their investigations, taking advantage of this 
technology’s accuracy and minimal cost. Despite its hesitation 
to rely on this precedent, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment is robust enough to curtail the use of 
GPS devices.
This Article will make two arguments; first, it will dem-
onstrate why search doctrine alone cannot address the issues 
raised by the use of GPS devices, and second, it will illustrate 
how the seizure prong of the Fourth Amendment requires law 
enforcement to obtain a warrant before attaching a GPS device 
to a vehicle. It may initially be counterintuitive to classify the 
use of GPS devices as a Fourth Amendment seizure. But in a 
legal realm where even “a search is not a search,”18 cognitive 
dissonance is inevitable.
In advancing the argument above, this Article will take a 
significant step towards formulating a conception of the Fourth 
Amendment and emerging technologies from a search and a sei-
zure perspective. At the same time, it will extend the analytical 
framework of this issue, thereby enabling the Fourth Amend-
ment to remain the ultimate arbiter at the nexus of privacy, se-
curity, technology, and government surveillance. After Part II 
of the Article outlines a brief history of the Fourth Amendment, 
Part III will explore the evolution of both search and seizure 
doctrines. This Article will then, in Part IV, examine why, under 
existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it will be difficult 
to categorize the use of GPS devices as a search. In Part V, the 
Article will examine GPS technology in light of seizure laws, 
concluding that it provides a better response to the applications 
of GPS technology than does the search doctrine. Ultimately, 
this Article establishes that the Constitution requires law en-
forcement to obtain a warrant before using GPS technology.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Like so many of the protections enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights, the Fourth Amendment is a product of the excesses of 
British hegemony preceding the American Revolution.19 The 
paradigmatic case of Wilkes v. Wood20 illustrates how British 
authorities regularly ignored their own maxim that “every man’s 
house is his castle.”21 John Wilkes was a Member of Parliament 
who, in 1763, wrote and published the North Briton Number 
45, a pamphlet criticizing one of King George III’s speeches.22 
Secretary of State Lord Halifax issued a warrant authorizing 
officers to “search for the authors, printers, and publishers of 
seditious and treasonable paper.”23 The warrant was general and 
specified no names.24 It simply authorized the officers to seize 
and detain anyone who they suspected of complicity in the pub-
lication of the pamphlet.25 These officers took their mission to 
heart, arresting forty-nine people in three days including the 
printer, who led them to Wilkes.26 When the officers attempted 
to arrest him, however, Wilkes resisted. The officers forcibly 
seized him and proceeded to search his house then seizing his 
papers and effects.27 After being imprisoned in the Tower of 
London, Wilkes won his release on habeas corpus grounds 
and successfully sued the Crown for damages.28 The American 
colonies celebrated his cause,29 particularly for his opposition 
to writs of assistance – general warrants permitting the bearer 
to enter any house or other place to search for and seize “‘pro-
hibited and uncustomed’ goods.”30 Wilkes’s case served as the 
catalyst for the creation of constitutional protections against 
these and other abuses by governmental authorities.31
Fast forward to 1928. At that time, only the physical in-
vasion of a protected space triggered Fourth Amendment pro-
tections. That year the Supreme Court considered Olmstead v. 
United States,32 which, for the first time, raised the specter of 
technology that could be used to conduct surveillance without 
breaching physical boundaries. Law enforcement had begun to 
use a variety of surveillance technologies to monitor the high 
technology of the era – the telephone. In Olmstead, federal 
agents used wiretaps to uncover a bootlegging operation spear-
headed by Roy Olmstead.33 Olmstead appealed his sentence on 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds after being tried and con-
victed of conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. The 
Court ruled that because there “was no entry of the houses of 
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offices of the defendants,” the police conducted neither a search 
nor a seizure.34
The Court later affirmed this logic in Silverman v. United 
States35 and Goldman v. United States.36 Like Olmstead, Gold-
man did not involve trespass or physical penetration of a space. 
Instead federal agents surveilled using a detectaphone, a device 
that, when pressed against a wall, allowed the user to over-
hear the conversation in 
the next room.37 Based 
heavily on the precedent 
of Olmstead, the Court 
found no Fourth Amend-
ment violation given the 
lack of trespass or physi-
cal invasion.38 By con-
trast, in Silverman the 
Court ruled that the use 
of a spike mike, which 
amplified the conversa-
tions of individuals in 
an illegal gambling es-
tablishment, triggered 
Fourth Amendment 
concerns.39 The officers 
inserted the spike mike 
“under a baseboard in a second-floor room of the vacant house 
and . . . the spike made contact with a heating duct serving the 
house occupied.”40 Thus the officers had tripped the physical 
invasion trigger of the Fourth Amendment.
Collectively these cases reveal a Court unwilling to adapt 
constitutional protections in the face of evolving and intrusive 
technologies. Their decisions steadfastly ignored or overlooked 
technical advances in favor of the blind application of legal 
principles. While Olmstead ignored the implications of tel-
ephonic technology,41 the Silverman Court explicitly ignored 
the evidence that advancing technology allowed for enhanced 
methods of surveillance, thus making it possible to eavesdrop 
on conversations without having to resort to traditional “bricks 
and mortar” trespass.42 In the face of prescient dissenting opin-
ions,43 the Court insisted on enforcing an increasingly obsolete 
conception of the Fourth Amendment focused exclusively on 
physical spaces. This conception threatened to render essential 
constitutional protections archaic in a modern and increasingly 
virtual world.
The Court would finally concede the impact of emerg-
ing technology on the Fourth Amendment paradigm in Katz v. 
United States, where they prioritized the privacy interests of 
“people, not places.”44 Katz was a gambler and police were 
aware of his illicit activities. They knew that he used a particular 
telephone in a particular telephone booth to make his wagers. 
Armed with this knowledge, they attached an electronic listen-
a Court unwilling to adapt 
constitutional protections in the face 
of evolving and intrusive technologies. 
Their decisions steadfastly ignored 
or overlooked technical advances in 
favor of the blind application of legal 
principles
ing and recording device to the outside of the public telephone 
booth from which he had placed his calls. This electronic sur-
veillance resulted in an eight-count indictment and conviction 
for interstate gambling.
While the parties briefed the issue of whether law enforce-
ment officials had penetrated a constitutionally protected area 
by monitoring the public phone booth, the Court “decline[d] 
to adopt this formula-
tion of the issues.”45 
In a doctrinal shift, the 
Court brushed aside the 
“eroded”46 underpin-
nings of Olmstead and 
Goldman. Instead the 
majority, without ar-
ticulating a clear test, 
established that law en-
forcement agents had 
indeed violated Katz’s 
Fourth Amendment 
rights. The Court has 
since adopted the test 
Justice Harlan proposed 
in his concurrence for 
determining the breach 
of an individual’s rights: “[F]irst that a person have exhibited 
an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and, second, that 
the expectation be one that society is objectively prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”47
III. AN EXPLORATION OF MODERN SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE DOCTRINE
At its most basic, the Fourth Amendment establishes a pro-
cedural requirement. It does not prohibit searches and seizures 
altogether, only those searches and seizures that are unreason-
able.48 To obtain a warrant, law enforcement is required to pro-
vide an oath, reasonable cause, and particularity with respect 
to the areas law enforcement seeks to search or the contraband 
they seek to seize.49 Of the six fundamental questions (who, 
what, when, where, why, how), the Fourth Amendment is most 
concerned with how. It asks law enforcement: How did you 
obtain the proffered evidence?
A. THE SEARCH PRONG OF THE MODERN  
 FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amend-
ment to presumptively bar searches conducted without a war-
rant.50 While there are problems with this approach,51 a warrant 
forces the police to “make a record before [rather than after a] 
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search.”52 A search, however, is not always a search53 and has 
instead become a legal term of art. The first question involves 
defining which searches implicate the Fourth Amendment, 
thereby activating the warrant requirement. Originally, as we 
have seen, the police only conducted a search when their actions 
involved trespass or physical penetration of a protected space 
such as a home or office.
More recently, commentators and the Court alike have 
struggled to articulate a precise definition of searches impli-
cating Fourth Amendment concerns. The inability to define a 
search has led to erratic and sometimes contradictory interpreta-
tions of the Amendment.54 Indeed, even the author of the current 
jurisprudential test, Justice Harlan, later expressed reservations 
regarding the test he developed.55 Consistent themes, however, 
do emerge from the case law, which in turn informs the contours 
of the search definition.
1. Testing Subjective Expectations and Objective  
 Reasonableness
First, the Court looks for evidence that an individual has 
manifested a subjective desire “to preserve something as pri-
vate.”56 In assessing subjective expectations, the Court consid-
ers the manner in which a person has used a particular location 
and whether they utilized the precautions customarily taken 
by those seeking privacy.57 A sincere desire for privacy, how-
ever, is not enough. Because a personal desire for privacy may 
be “‘conditioned’ by influences alien to [established] Fourth 
Amendment”58 boundaries, the Court has observed an objective 
component to the test.59
The objective element of the test considers whether “soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’ the right to privacy 
asserted by the individual.”60 As might be expected, the Court 
has placed more emphasis on the objective, rather than subjec-
tive, prong of the inquiry. At the same time, the Court has not 
“explicitly defined the precise factors that render a subjective 
expectation objectively reasonable.”61 For some, this reluctance 
indicates that the Court is simply “substituti[ng] . . . words for 
analysis” and objectivity.62 A survey of the Court’s decisions, 
however, does provide some practical guidance. The Court has 
considered how an individual uses a certain location,63 whether 
“precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy”64 
were taken, and whether the Framers contemplated the particu-
lar type of intrusion.65 Furthermore, in its analysis of enhanced 
surveillance techniques, the Court inquires as to the intrusive-
ness of law enforcement’s encroachment into personal zones. 
Two types of intrusiveness are relevant to the Court’s inquiry.66
I. What Type of Information Does the Technology 
Provide?
Just as the Fourth Amendment asks how law enforcement 
obtained its evidence, the Court, in its treatment of enhanced 
surveillance technologies, asks how the technology works. The 
Court has delineated two types of technologies based on its ju-
risprudence. On one hand, the Court has categorized as “sense 
augmenting” any technology that reveals information that could 
theoretically be attained using any of the five human senses. 
This technology typically falls into the category of a mechanical 
substitute or enhancement of human senses. On the other hand, 
the Court has designated as “extrasensory” technology that pro-
vides details that the human senses alone could not deduce.
Two decisions illustrate the Court’s treatment of sense aug-
menting technology. First, in Smith, the Court permitted law 
enforcement’s use of a pen register, which they described as 
mere sense augmentation. The Court explained that a device 
“disclos[ing] only the telephone numbers that have been dialed” 
did not indicate that a search had occurred.67 It reasoned that “[t]
he switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely 
the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, 
personally completed calls for the subscriber.”68 Because the 
pen register failed to disclose the content of the telephone call, 
the identities of the parties, and “whether the call was even com-
pleted,” the Court concluded that the search did not implicate 
the Fourth Amendment.69
Later, in United States v. Knotts, the Court considered a 
technology unrelated to telephony. There the Court classified as 
sense augmenting a beeper placed in a barrel of chloroform that 
was later sold to the defendant. The beeper in question was a 
relatively unsophisticated tracking device emitting a weak radio 
signal, enabling law enforcement to follow it using a receiver.70 
The beeper did not telegraph its actual location, only the rela-
tive distance between the receiver and the beeper. The signal 
became stronger as the receiver moved closer to the beeper, and 
became weaker when moved further away.71 During its analy-
sis of the objective prong of the Katz two-part test, the Court 
evaluated the intrusiveness of the beeper. At several points, the 
Court noted that the beeper did not reveal information that could 
not otherwise be discovered through unaided observation.72 The 
Court also analogized use of the beeper to “the following of an 
automobile on public streets and highways.”73 Consequently, 
the Court concluded that use of the beeper constituted sense 
augmenting technology, which did not qualify as a search for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.
In contrast, the Court generally issues greater privacy 
protections when addressing cases involving extrasensory 
technology. Indeed, the case law suggests that extrasensory sur-
veillance is almost per se prohibited without a warrant.74 Kyllo 
v. United States stands in contrast to the Court’s often permis-
sive attitude towards sense augmenting technology. In this case, 
federal agents suspected that Kyllo was growing marijuana in 
his home by using the high intensity lamps necessary for indoor 
marijuana growth.75 Using a thermal imaging device, the agents 
scanned the outer walls of Kyllo’s home for differences in the 
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amount of heat emanating from different parts of the house. The 
device indicated that there was more heat emanating from the 
garage and side wall than from other areas of the house. Based 
on this information, the agents secured a warrant and searched 
the home, finding marijuana plants. At trial, Kyllo moved to 
suppress the evidence, and the question of whether the use of a 
thermal imaging device constituted a search eventually reached 
the Supreme Court.
The Court dismissed the argument that the thermal imager 
did not reveal information about the house’s interior76 before 
concluding that the imager constitutes an extrasensory device.77 
By contrast, the dissenters found that use of the imager did 
not constitute a search only after finding that it was a sense 
augmenting device. Despite the Court’s ostensible rejection of 
formalistic application of the Fourth Amendment,78 both the 
majority and dissent opted for slightly mechanical interpreta-
tions. For both, their analyses ended after categorization of the 
technology as either sense augmenting or extrasensory.
II. How Much Information Does the Technology Expose?
In addition to the type of technology used, the Court has 
consistently considered the quantity of information revealed by 
surveillance technology. In Katz, the Court was guided by the 
degree of intrusion associated with eavesdropping. The device 
broadcasted not only the volume or number dialed, but also the 
“words . . . utter[ed] into the mouthpiece.”79 In contrast, the 
Court has declined to extend Fourth Amendment protections 
when faced with a lesser intrusion in similar circumstances.80 
Furthermore, the Court looked beyond the quantity of informa-
tion revealed by the beeper in Knotts and also noted that the type 
of surveillance practiced by law enforcement vis-à-vis beeper 
technology did not constitute “dragnet” surveillance.81 The 
Court cautioned that its opinion should not be read as authoriz-
ing “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen . . . without 
judicial knowledge or supervision.”82
Similarly, in Dow Chemical Co v. United States the Court 
considered whether aerial photography of an industrial plant 
constituted an unreasonable search.83 After quickly concluding 
that the photography revealed nothing more than a mild aug-
mentation of “a simple flyover with naked-eye observation,”84 
the Court considered the amount of detail contained in the pho-
tographs. The Court reasoned that because “no objects as small 
as ! inch in diameter, such as a class ring, for example” were 
identifiable, no “serious privacy concerns” were raised.85 Based 
on its considerations of both the type and quantity of informa-
tion revealed, the Court concluded that the search did not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment.86 The Court cautioned, however, 
that methods providing more detail indeed might trigger Fourth 
Amendment concerns.87
These cases demonstrate the Supreme Court’s consistent 
practice of considering the quantity of information revealed by 
surveillance technology and the type of intrusiveness involved. 
Both Knotts and Dow Chemical Co. involved sense augmenting 
technology typically unfettered by Fourth Amendment restric-
tions. Yet in both cases, the Court indicated there are limits to 
the use of even this type of technology. That limit is calibrated 
by the quantity of information revealed.
Therefore, for the protections of the Fourth Amendment to 
apply, an individual’s exhibited desire to keep something pri-
vate must complement a general societal interest in keeping it 
private. Where law enforcement employs the use of enhanced 
surveillance techniques, the Court will consider both the type 
and quantity of intrusion when determining society’s interest 
in keeping something private. This standard is instructive in as-
sessing how lower federal courts and state courts have grappled 
with issues of GPS technology.
B. STATE AND LOWER FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS  
 REGARDING THE USE OF GPS TECHNOLOGY
The treatment of this issue by lower courts is decidedly 
mixed. To date, three Federal Circuits88 and four state Supreme 
Courts have directly addressed this issue. Three of these courts 
have determined that the use of GPS devices does not constitute 
a search, with four others finding the opposite. The courts find-
ing that no search has occurred based their analysis on Knotts, 
whereas the courts finding that a search had occurred bypassed 
accepted Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Collectively, Wisconsin, the Seventh, and the Ninth Cir-
cuits do not consider the use of GPS devices to be a search. Each 
court found Knotts to be controlling. For example, Judge Posner 
in United States v. Garcia briefly considered the technologi-
cal advancement of GPS’ only to conclude that it represented 
a “modest improvement” over beeper technology.89 Brushing 
past those concerns, he concluded that because there was no 
evidence that law enforcement was, in fact engaging in mass 
surveillance, the use of GPS technology by law enforcement 
officers who “have a suspect in their sights,” raised no constitu-
tional concerns.90 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in United States 
v. Pineda-Moreno perceived no distinction between short- and 
long-term surveillance.91
These courts have ignored the difference between GPS 
and beeper technology and instead accepted that one tracking 
technology is analogous to another. They considered only the 
fruits of the technology rather than the method (the “how”) of 
procurement. Those courts finding that a search has occurred, 
on the other hand, considered the issue more thoroughly. Unfor-
tunately, their analysis can be of limited value because it is not 
rooted in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Largely, only state supreme courts have found the use of 
GPS devices to constitute a search, basing their reasoning in 
state rather than federal, law. The only federal circuit to find that 
the use of GPS devices constituted a search did not fully ground 
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its reasoning in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Rather, the 
D.C. Circuit looked partially to the “mosaic theory” invoked 
in cases involving national security and California state law to 
justify its decision.92
For example, the Washington Supreme Court first consid-
ered the issue of GPS technology in Washington v. Jackson.93 
Law enforcement obtained a 10-day warrant to attach GPS de-
vices to two of Jackson’s vehicles. The devices eventually led 
authorities to his daughter’s body, which was buried in a remote 
area of the forest. A jury later convicted Jackson of murder. The 
Washington Supreme Court considered the appellate court’s as-
sertion that “installation and use of GPS devices on vehicles 
[did] not constitute a search or sei-
zure” under the Washington State 
Constitution.94 The court held that 
observing items exposed to the 
public does not constitute a search 
even when using “particularly in-
trusive method[s] of viewing.”95 
The court continued, noting that the 
“nature and extent of information 
obtained” was relevant when con-
sidering whether an expectation of 
privacy is reasonable.96 Despite re-
lying on state law and precedent the 
Jackson court also considered both 
of the intrusiveness factors implicit 
in a Fourth Amendment analysis, 
concluding that the intrusion of 
GPS devices was sufficient to merit 
warrant protection.97
New York courts also recently considered this issue in New 
York v. Weaver.98 There, police attached a GPS device, for no 
discernable reason,99 to the defendant’s vehicle. Evidence from 
the GPS device was later used to show that the defendant was 
present at a K-Mart around the time it was burgled. A jury con-
victed the defendant of burgling the K-Mart based in part on the 
GPS evidence. The court rested its decision to classify the use of 
the GPS device as a search on many arguments. First, it found 
that GPS technology differed significantly from “primitive” 
beeper technology.100 Skipping over the subjective requirement, 
the court then cited to several cases asserting the existence of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy on the open road.101 Finally, 
the court referenced both intrusiveness factors, concluding that 
GPS devices contain “sophisticated and powerful technology” 
which provides more than a “mere enhancement of human sen-
sory capacity.”102 In other words, the court concluded that GPS 
devices provide a fantastic quantity of information that would 
not otherwise be available to the five human senses. Despite 
considering the case primarily under Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence, the court acknowledged that federal law in this area is 
not settled and that this issue has not been addressed by the ma-
jority of federal courts. It therefore rested its decision on state 
rather than federal law.
Most recently in 2010, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
considered the issue of GPS tracking in United States v. May-
nard. There law enforcement tracked the suspect, Antoine Jones, 
for over a month without a warrant. Information provided by the 
GPS device placed on his car was used to arrest and convict 
him for drug-related crimes. After distinguishing the case from 
Knotts because of its lengthy surveillance period, the court con-
cluded that Jones’s movements were not “actually exposed to 
the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all those 
movements is effectively nil.”103 In 
reaching this conclusion, the D.C. 
Circuit considered what a reason-
able person would expect another to 
do. In so doing, it ignored the prec-
edent set by the Supreme Court in 
Knotts and Karo that required lower 
courts to focus on the information 
that can be theoretically, rather 
than reasonably, acquired by visual 
surveillance.104
Furthermore, the court exam-
ined which movements of Jones 
were constructively exposed.105 
When considering the constructive 
exposure issue, however, the court 
did not rely on any Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. Instead, it cited 
primarily to a FOIA case and the mosaic theory, which the gov-
ernment often invoked in cases involving national security.106 
Neither FOIA nor mosaic theory has its roots in the Fourth 
Amendment. Its only reference to any Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence was its token referral to Smith v. Maryland, in which 
it found implicit support for its position.107
Courts take widely differing approaches to the use of GPS 
devices but share one characteristic: their focus on the search 
prong of the Fourth Amendment. These differing approaches 
have predictably led to differing standards and conclusions. Ul-
timately, Maynard is the exception that proves existing Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence does not consider the use of GPS 
devices to constitute a search. Privacy advocates would thus do 
better to seek protection under the seizure prong.
C. THE MODERN SEIZURE CLAUSE
In terms of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, seizures are 
the bridesmaids to a search’s bride.108 Defendants typically chal-
lenge the search itself rather than the seizure of items taken 
during the search. Seizures are generally the by-product of a 
prior search; after all, how else would law enforcement stumble 
Courts take widely differing 
approaches to the use of 
GPS devices but share one 
characteristic: their focus 
on the search prong of the 
Fourth Amendment.
B$8B&/%LQGG $0
Criminal Law Brief 43
upon the contraband?109 As a result, the seizure jurisprudence is 
far less developed than the search jurisprudence. Nevertheless, 
the two prongs of the Fourth Amendment protect the same in-
terests: privacy, property, and liberty.110 Despite the perception 
that search primarily protects privacy111 and seizure mainly pro-
tects property and liberty,112 significant overlap exists between 
the two. Indeed, both are instrumental in enforcing the Fourth 
Amendment’s safeguards.113
Like searches, seizures of personal property without a war-
rant are considered per se unreasonable, and the question of 
Fourth Amendment protection turns on the definition of sei-
zure.114 Also like search, the term “seizure” has become a term 
of art. Here, however, the similarities end. For the most part, the 
courts have articulated and applied a singular, coherent defini-
tion for what constitutes a seizure. As is the case with most 
constitutional issues, there is some discussion and tension re-
garding the test and its scope, but seizure does not arouse the 
same level of interpretive difficulties, passion, or commentary 
as the search prong. “A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there 
is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory 
interests in that property.”115 Application of this standard reveals 
the analytical framework pertinent to the seizure analysis. The 
Court conducts a three-part test to determine first whether a 
seizure occurred and next, whether that seizure was reasonable.
1. There Must Be a Possessory Interest at Stake
First, the Court requires that a possessory interest be at 
stake. For example, in Jacobsen, Federal Express employees 
noticed white powder spilling out of a damaged package.116 
They notified DEA officials who, after conducting a field test 
on a trace amount, determined that the powder was cocaine.117 
The DEA agents obtained a warrant and arrested the respon-
dents at the recipient’s residence.118 At trial, the defendants chal-
lenged several aspects of the DEA’s conduct; most important to 
the seizure analysis was their challenge to the field test of the 
powder.119 The Court found that the DEA’s actions implicated a 
property interest because the defendants had a property interest 
in the white powder.
Despite the requirement of a possessory interest, the Court 
is mindful that seizures can impact any of the interests protected 
by the Fourth Amendment: liberty, privacy, or property. United 
States v. Place is an example of the Court recognizing that the 
liberty interest, coupled with a nominal possessory interest, may 
trigger seizure concerns.120 In Place, DEA officials detained an 
airline passenger for ninety minutes while they conducted a 
“sniff test” on his luggage. The Court found that the detention 
“effectively restrain[ed] the [passenger because] he is subjected 
to the possible disruption of his travel plans in order to remain 
with his luggage or to arrange for its return.”121 The Court found 
that this detention and the resulting infringement upon the pas-
senger’s liberty interests constituted a seizure of the individual.
I. The Possessory Interest is Not Limited to Tangible Items
Traditionally, seizure denies physical possession or enjoy-
ment of a physical item to all others. In other words, seizure is 
typically concerned with the actual confiscation of a physical 
item.122 The Supreme Court has, on occasion, recognized that 
Fourth Amendment seizure law also provides for a possessory 
interest in intangible items, such as their words. In Berger v. 
New York, the Court ruled that the recording of a human voice 
is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.123 Any possessory 
interest one has in one’s voice is intangible. The language of 
the majority opinion clarified that the wiretaps constituted both 
a seizure and a search.124 The Court reaffirmed their stance in 
Katz, stating that “the Fourth Amendment governs not only the 
seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording 
of oral statements . . . .”125 The Court unambiguously stated 
that “the Government’s activities in electronically listening to 
and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon 
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and 
thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”126
Additionally, federal appellate courts have acknowledged 
that intangible privacy interests are also protected under the 
seizure prong. Both the Second and D.C. Circuits have ob-
served this right in the context of considering photographs 
as seizures.127 Ayeni I is particularly instructive on this point. 
There, law enforcement officials attempted to execute a warrant 
against Babatunde Ayendi for credit card fraud. The agents were 
accompanied at all times by a CBS television crew. The crew 
filmed every second of the intrusion from the agents “push[ing] 
[Mrs. Ayeni] in the chest” to her interrogation at the hands of 
the agents and the crying of Ayeni’s son.128 The Second Cir-
cuit ruled that the “video and sound recordings were seizures 
under the Fourth Amendment” because they seized “images 
and sounds of the Ayeni home, and of the Ayenis themselves,” 
broadcasting them “for public viewing by television audiences 
across the country.”129 The court indicated that it recognized the 
serious privacy interest in the sanctity of the home and in the in-
dividuals themselves, which were infringed upon by the seizure 
of images and sounds of their homes and persons. These outli-
ers notwithstanding, courts traditionally have been reluctant to 
extend Fourth Amendment seizure protections to intangible or 
virtual property.130
2. The Government Must Interfere With the Interest
After identifying the interest at stake, the Court considers 
whether the government has interfered with that interest. The 
government has interfered with a possessory interest when it ex-
erts “dominion and control” over it.131 In Jacobsen, DEA agents 
took a trace amount of the white powder out of the package and 
then tested it. By manipulating the powder, the agents exerted 
dominion and control over it. The testing of the powder “con-
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verted . . . a temporary deprivation of possessory interests into 
a permanent one.”1 A permanent deprivation, however, is not 
always necessary to satisfy this standard. In Place, a deprivation 
of liberty for ninety minutes was sufficient.133
Furthermore, even deprivation of the interest is not re-
quired. In United States v. Va Lerie, after a careful consider-
ation of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that the seizure standard also prohibited the “govern-
ment’s conversion of an individual’s private property.”134 The 
Va Lerie court was careful to distinguish conversion from mere 
trespass as requiring “an intent to exercise a dominion or control 
over the goods which is in fact inconsistent with the [owner’s] 
rights” and noting that “the gist of conversion is the interference 
with control of the [owner’s] property.”135
3. The Court Balances the Intrusion against the  
 Governmental Interests
If both of the preceding questions are answered in the af-
firmative, the Court then “balance[s] the nature and quality of 
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to 
justify the intrusion.”136 The Court conducted its most promi-
nent balancing act in Terry v. Ohio. There the Court described 
at least three governmental interests to be considered: effective 
crime prevention, investigating crime, and the need to ensure 
that a suspect is not armed.137 At the same time, the Court rec-
ognized that the seizure of an individual was no “petty indig-
nity” and represented a “serious intrusion upon the sanctity of 
the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong 
resentment.”138 Despite the intensity of the intrusion, the Court 
determined that its scope was limited,139 concluding that the 
weighty governmental interests balanced out the intrusion of 
the seizure. Nevertheless, the Court carefully calibrated its lan-
guage to limit the scope of its own holding, emphasizing that 
each case turned on its own set of facts, while limiting the de-
tention authority of an officer only to limited intrusions and 
only when based on reasonable, articulable suspicion.140 The 
Court has not circumscribed the factors they examined to de-
termine the “nature and quality” of the intrusion, but the case 
law indicates the factors that have guided the Court’s seizure 
inquiry in the past.
I. The Court looks to the Intrusiveness of the 
Government’s Seizure
The first factor is the intrusiveness of the government’s 
seizure. As the Court noted in Place, “intrusion . . . occasioned 
by a seizure of one’s personal effects can vary both in its nature 
and extent.”141 Moreover, seizures reasonable at inception “can 
nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its manner 
of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests.”142 At 
the low end of the intrusion spectrum is a dog sniff, which “does 
not require opening the luggage[,] does not expose noncontra-
band items that otherwise would remain hidden”143 and which 
“discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contra-
band item.”144 Despite the fact that the sniff conveys informa-
tion, the intrusiveness itself is limited, ensuring that the owner 
is not subject to embarrassment and inconvenience. Contrast a 
dog sniff to the seizure in Place where authorities intruded upon 
both possessory and liberty interests. Law enforcement severely 
intruded on Place’s liberty interest by subjecting him to “the co-
ercive atmosphere of a custodial confinement.”145 Furthermore, 
the Court established a spectrum when assessing the intrusion 
into possessory interests. The intrusion is less severe when the 
individual “has relinquished control of the property to a third 
party” or when the government confines its investigation to an 
“on-the-spot inquiry.”146 By contrast, when an individual retains 
control of their possession and the government transports their 
property elsewhere, the intrusiveness is more severe.
II. The Duration of the Seizure is also Germane to the 
Court’s Analysis
The other salient factor in the Court’s balancing analysis 
is the duration of the seizure. In Place, a detention for ninety 
minutes was enough for the Court to conclude that the seizure 
was unreasonable. Indeed, the Court implied that the length of 
the detention itself provided sufficient grounds for finding the 
seizure unreasonable.147 In comparison, when faced with an 
interference with possessory interests, the Court has permit-
ted delays of up to twenty-nine hours.148 Brevity, however, 
is not always a determining factor. In Jacobsen, DEA officials 
permanently destroyed the white powder they were testing.149 
Nevertheless, because the scope of the intrusion was so trivial150 
the Court concluded that the agent’s actions were reasonable.
Hence, for the Court to find that a Fourth Amendment sei-
zure has occurred, it must find that the government meaning-
fully interfered with a protected interest. If such interference 
implicates the Fourth Amendment, the Court then will assess 
the reasonableness of the seizure. Primary in the Court’s analy-
sis are 1) the interests of law enforcement in effecting the sei-
zure and 2) the manner in which they conduct the seizure. If the 
intrusiveness or scope of the seizure cannot be justified by law 
enforcement’s interests, then the seizure is unreasonable.
4. Intersection of Fourth Amendment and First  
 Amendment
The use of GPS devices, however, raises not only Fourth 
Amendment concerns. GPS devices are used principally to track 
individuals, to uncover where they travel to, and, using this 
information, to solve crimes. Sometimes, as in Jackson, GPS 
devices are used when police already have information that a 
crime occurred and are using such devices to fill the gaps in 
their information. Other times, as in Garcia, the police suspect 
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that the individual will commit a crime. Police can then use the 
GPS device to establish whether a potential suspect was at the 
scene of the crime when it actually occurs. But the devices are 
not intelligent; instead they are merely passive, relaying a set of 
coordinates or an address. The latitude and longitude provided 
by GPS devices represent more than a physical address. Loca-
tions are a proxy for the people and businesses they represent. 
Therefore, more than mere locations, GPS devices provide an 
index of known associates and associations and insight into the 
frequency of those associations. The attachment of a GPS de-
vice, then, implicates fundamental First Amendment freedom of 
association concerns.151
The Constitution protects freedom of association from state 
intrusion in two ways: 1) the Court protects the “choices to enter 
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships;” and 
2) the Court recognizes the right to 
engage in those activities protected 
by the First Amendment: speech, 
assembly, petition of the redress of 
grievances, and the exercise of re-
ligion.152 The government’s actions 
do not have to directly trigger First 
Amendment freedom of association 
concerns. Instead the Court pro-
scribes government action that has 
the effect of discouraging or poten-
tially limiting the free exercise of 
First Amendment protections, but 
which are unintended to affect as-
sociation.153 Additionally, the Court 
has not hesitated to restrict govern-
ment action even where the “gov-
ernmental action challenged may 
appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties.”154
First Amendment protections extend only to constitution-
ally protected speech and associations. The Court has, however, 
found that First Amendment protections with respect to the free-
dom to associate are quite broad. Indeed, the First Amendment 
protects the right to “associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, 
and cultural ends.”155 The Court has unequivocally stated that 
the First Amendment protects the “formation and preservation 
of . . . highly personal relationships” from “unjustified inter-
ference by the State.”156 Moreover, the Court recognizes that 
“the constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects 
the realization that individuals draw much of their emotional 
enrichment from close ties with others.”157 Implicit in protecting 
these relationships is the “ability independently to define one’s 
identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”158
Government infringement on these guaranteed freedoms 
could take “a number of forms.”159 Several of these forms are 
pertinent to the use of GPS devices. At a basic level, the use of 
GPS devices inevitably interferes with the formation and pres-
ervation of personal relationships because it threatens to reveal 
not only political and religious affiliations but also undermines 
an individual’s independent establishment of identity. More se-
riously, it threatens to forcibly disclose the fact of group mem-
bership. Most importantly, the use of GPS devices threatens to 
chill the fundamental First Amendment freedom to associate. 
Under constant threat of GPS surveillance individuals may be 
less likely to attend political rallies or undergo medical treat-
ment such as psychological evaluation. Under the specter of 
relentless tracking, individuals may also be less likely to engage 
in the religious and social associations that the First Amend-
ment expressly protects.
The point of this discussion is 
not to argue that GPS devices inevi-
tably trample on First Amendment 
concerns. Whether the use of a GPS 
device implicates the right to asso-
ciation turns on the facts and cir-
cumstances of the individual case. 
It is irrelevant that there might be a 
narrow and wholly unrealistic case 
where the police affix a GPS device 
to a car whose owner uses it solely 
for criminal purposes. Critically, 
the use of GPS devices constantly 
and inevitably threatens to reveal 
and chill associations protected by 
the First Amendment: the “forma-
tion and preservation of highly per-
sonal relationships” or social, political, or religious associations 
that an individual seeks to protect from government scrutiny 
and interference. The use of GPS devices raises the concern 
that the information provided by these devices intrudes on First 
Amendment protections.
These First Amendment concerns fundamentally alter the 
Fourth Amendment inquiry.160 Where searches or seizure impli-
cate both the Fourth Amendment161 and the First Amendment, 
the Fourth Amendment is applied with “scrupulous exacti-
tude.”162 In particular, the “[c]ourts will scrutinize any large 
scale seizure of . . . materials presumptively protected under the 
First Amendment.”163 Having evaluated the current state of both 
the search and seizure doctrines, this Article will now consider 
whether the use of GPS devices falls under either category.
The attachment of a GPS 
device, then, implicates 
fundamental First 




IV. THE CHALLENGES OF CONSIDERING  
GPS TECHNOLOGY A SEARCH UNDER THE  
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has not yet opined on the status of GPS 
technology. The case for considering the use of GPS technology 
to be a search ignores the assorted obstacles presented by both 
the relevant jurisprudence and its application at both the federal 
and state levels.
A. THE BEEPER CASES ARE NOT ANALOGOUS TO 
  THE USE OF GPS DEVICES
The first obstacle in considering the typical GPS case164 
is to remove it from the ambit of Knotts. In Knotts, the police 
knew that Armstrong had purchased the ingredients to create 
illicit drugs. The police, with the consent of the seller of the 
ingredients, arranged to place a beeper in the container sold 
to Armstrong. The beeper emitted a signal monitored by a re-
ceiver; the strength of the signal indicated the distance between 
the two. A stronger signal meant that the receiver was closer 
to the beeper and vice versa. When visual surveillance failed, 
the police used the beeper to find Armstrong’s vehicle. The de-
fense in Knotts later moved to suppress the evidence given the 
warrantless monitoring of the beeper, but the Supreme Court 
rejected this argument.
Every court that considers the warrantless use of GPS de-
vices begins its analysis with Knotts. Both involve leveraging 
technology to supplement surveillance of an individual’s move-
ments in public spaces. Despite the striking similarities between 
the two, the language of Knotts suggests that it should not con-
trol the decision reached in a GPS case. Most importantly, the 
Court warned that Knotts should not extend to precisely the sce-
nario created by the use of GPS devices. Faced with the argu-
ment that Knotts would lead to “dragnet-type law enforcement 
practices,” the Court distinguished between the type of surveil-
lance conducted in that case and “twenty-four hour surveillance 
of any citizen of this country . . . without judicial knowledge 
or supervision.”165 GPS technology enables what beepers could 
not—the flawless, uninterrupted, and twenty-four hour tracking 
of a suspect. Even if the Court could not have anticipated this 
particular technology, they could anticipate the consequences 
of such emerging technologies. The Court expressly declined 
to extend the holding of Knotts to that scenario.
Moreover, law enforcement’s use of GPS devices differs 
significantly from its use of beeper technology. The implemen-
tation of the various technologies varies as greatly as does the 
underlying technology itself. Beeper technology is hardly more 
sophisticated than playing Marco Polo.166 The nature of beeper 
technology forces the police to physically follow the individuals 
they suspect of wrongdoing. The beeper does not transmit its 
actual location; rather it transmits only its location relative to 
the receiver. GPS technology, on the other hand, involves the si-
multaneous use of several satellites to pinpoint one’s location.167 
Initially designed for military use, it has only recently been de-
classified and has consistently become more accurate. The dif-
ference between the two is as stark as the difference between 
smoke signals and cellular technology for communication.
Their implementation reflects the relative sophistication of 
the technologies. Beepers are pure tracking devices enabling 
only one thing—visual surveillance. GPS technology, on the 
other hand, enables law enforcement to forego actual surveil-
lance and track the movements of a suspect over long stretches 
of time.168 Rather than actively transmitting their location, GPS 
devices are passive, reading information from various satellites 
and in turn facilitating a new perception of the world. Previ-
ously law enforcement used beeper technology in their attempt 
to catch individuals during the commission of a crime. Now, 
they use GPS technology ex post, without any particularized 
suspicion.169
The differences in the technology and implementation in-
dicate that GPS devices are not tracking devices and should not 
be treated as such. For these reasons, the Court should recognize 
that the holding in Knotts does not automatically dispose of a 
GPS case. With this obstacle surmounted, the next challenge 
arises when considering the use of GPS technology under the 
Court’s two-part Katz test.
B. THERE IS NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF  
 PRIVACY IN ONE’S MOVEMENTS ALONG PUBLIC  
 THOROUGHFARES
An individual traveling in public surrenders some of the 
privacy protections afforded to other aspects of everyday life. 
While other areas of life allow us to demonstrate a desire for 
privacy, travel in public, particularly by automobile, is easily 
visible.
1. An Individual Cannot Demonstrate a Subjective  
 Desire for Privacy
The first consideration is an individual’s demonstrated sub-
jective desire for privacy. It should be noted that the Court does 
not emphasize this prong of the test. A demonstrated personal 
desire for privacy is not as important as the second, objective 
consideration. This desire for privacy, however, must still exist 
and be discernable, which is problematic. It is difficult to imag-
ine how a car owner might express a subjective desire for pri-
vacy in the physical movements of his vehicle. Ironically, any 
evasive action a driver might take to shed surveillance can be 
presented as sufficient probable cause to justify a warrant per-
mitting the very type of surveillance the driver sought to evade.
In Katz, the Court found that an individual exhibited a 
subjective desire for privacy after occupying a telephone booth 
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and “shut[ting] the door behind him.”170 Responding to the gov-
ernment’s argument that the booth itself was glass, enabling 
passers-by to see Katz and thus detracting from his privacy, 
the Court stated that what Katz wanted to “exclude from the 
booth” was not the eye, but the uninvited ear. Shutting the door 
does not exclude an uninvited eye from seeing where the car is 
going. It is unclear how a person may convey that they value the 
privacy of the movements of a car that are after all, visible to the 
public. There is, of course, some difference between an expecta-
tion that one can be seen on the open road and an expectation 
that one will be followed on the open road. One does not beget 
the other. This idea, however, does not speak to subjective but 
rather to objective concerns.
2. Society Does Not Recognize the Desire to Keep 
  Private One’s Movements on Public  
 Thoroughfares
The objective prong of the Katz two-part test asks what 
society considers to be a reasonable desire to retain information 
as private. Long before the advent of GPS devices and satel-
lite surveillance, the Supreme Court recognized that individuals 
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in their vehi-
cles.171 Individuals, however, possess a lesser expectation of pri-
vacy on the open road than they do in their homes or offices.172 
Despite this general expectation of privacy on the open road, 
the Court forcefully rejected the notion that an individual may 
have any reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements 
along public thoroughfares.173 The Court instead asserted that 
because an individual voluntarily conveys the fact of whatever 
stops are made, they cannot claim privacy in the movements of 
their car.174
i. GPS Devices Are Not Intrusive Enough
Privacy advocates look to the intrusiveness inquiry for pro-
tection. They maintain that GPS technology represents an un-
precedented encroachment into personal areas. This technology 
has the potential to compile a comprehensive profile of where 
you go, with whom you associate, and what you carry.175 On 
one hand, GPS devices provide a tremendous amount of infor-
mation. On the other, it is most readily classified as a sense 
augmenting rather than extrasensory device.176
Notwithstanding the judgments of the state courts to ad-
dress the issue,177 GPS technology does not provide any infor-
mation that is unavailable to the five human senses. While the 
device does not provide visual imagery, it does communicate 
only information that the human eye could perceive on its own. 
A GPS device only reveals information that could have been 
attained through visual surveillance.178 The Supreme Court has 
indicated through its decisions in Knotts and Karo that its analy-
sis focuses on whether the information could have been attained 
using only visual surveillance and not whether it is practically 
possible to have done so.179 It is, of course, theoretically pos-
sible for a police department to “hir[e] another 10 million police 
officers to tail every vehicle on the nation’s roads.”180
In Dow Chemical Co., the Court emphasized that sense 
augmenting technology might be unconstitutional if it provides 
too much detail.181 Realistically, the amount of detail that can be 
provided by GPS technology is truly stunning. A GPS provides 
real time location information with an accuracy of ten to fifteen 
centimeters.182 This quantity of information leads some com-
mentators to claim that it “merits defining use of the technology 
a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”183 This claim 
ignores the differences between the quantity of information at 
stake in Dow Chemical Co. and GPS use. In Dow Chemical Co., 
the Court implied that cameras providing greater detail might 
implicate more serious privacy concerns. The added accuracy 
was critical because it provided more information to law en-
forcement. If we were to graph the relationship between ac-
curacy and privacy with respect to aerial photography, it would 
demonstrate an inverse linear relationship. The more detail the 
cameras provided, the less privacy an individual could retain. 
Therefore, cameras providing facial details erode privacy and 
cameras providing even minute details as small as a class ring 
erode one’s sense of privacy even more.
By contrast, enhanced accuracy in GPS devices, after a cer-
tain point, does not implicate greater privacy concerns. Whether 
the devices are accurate to ten centimeters, one meter, or ten 
meters is largely irrelevant. Of course, some level of accuracy 
is necessary. The level of accuracy needed, however, is quite 
low. Beepers are both unsophisticated and imprecise and have 
been used successfully by law enforcement for years before 
the invention of GPS devices. Unlike the relationship between 
cameras and privacy, the relationship between GPS devices and 
privacy represents an upside down plateau. With accuracy on 
the x-axis and privacy on the y-axis, privacy decreases as accu-
racy increases. It does so, however, only to a point, after which 
the marginal loss in privacy is quite low and the graph levels as 
accuracy increases.
The Court can make a number of arguments against clas-
sifying the use of GPS technology as a search. If it does not 
dispense with the argument perfunctorily under Knotts, the 
Court will struggle to discern a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy from the individual. Even if an individual were to some-
how divine a way to exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy 
in the movements of his automobile, the Court will struggle 
to identify a corresponding objective expectation as reflected 
in society. GPS technology provides detailed, intimate profiles 
of our lives, the profiles of which are inherently public. The 
information revealed by GPS devices allows law enforcement 
to passively track our movements with pinpoint accuracy, yet 
none of these actions implicate constitutional concerns. Law 
enforcement simply becomes more efficient with the activities 
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they have conducted for millennia. This type of advancement is 
one that the Supreme Court has been loath to obstruct.184
V. THE USE OF GPS DEVICES  
CONSTITUTES A SEIZURE
Privacy advocates need not force consideration of GPS de-
vices into a search paradigm. After all, the Fourth Amendment 
protects against both unreasonable searches and unreasonable 
seizures. Shelter from the warrantless use of GPS devices lies 
in the protections against unlawful 
seizures enshrined in the Fourth 
Amendment, but is rarely applied. 
It should be noted that the Court in 
Karo has already held that the use 
of a beeper did not constitute a sei-
zure. The Justices’ cursory analysis 
reasoned that at most a technical 
trespass occurred which did not 
meaningfully interfere with one’s 
possessory interest in a vehicle. 
The following discussion illustrates 
the flaws with this cursory analy-
sis, echoed most recently by Judge 
Posner in Garcia (which failed to 
even apply the seizure test). The 
majority’s analysis of this issue was 
strictly conclusory. Rather than ex-
plain why attaching a beeper to a 
vehicle did not constitute a seizure, 
the majority simply stated that a 
beeper did not impair any privacy 
interests.185 The dissent presented 
a more forceful and coherent argu-
ment, recognizing that attachment 
of a beeper converted the vehicle into an informant for the 
police.186
Admittedly, it is somewhat counterintuitive to classify the 
use of a GPS device as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
As Judge Posner succinctly articulated in Garcia:
The [GPS] device did not affect the car’s driving quali-
ties, did not draw power from the car’s engine or bat-
tery, did not take up room that might otherwise have 
been occupied by passengers or packages, did not even 
alter the car’s appearance, and in short did not “seize” 
the car in any intelligible sense of the word.187
His observations, while accurate, fail on two related counts. 
First, he fails to acknowledge that the Fourth Amendment sei-
zure doctrine recognizes that law enforcement can seize intan-
gible items.188 Additionally, he betrays the application of the 
wrong seizure standard. While Judge Posner did not articulate 
precisely what test he was applying, his argument implied that 
the use or enjoyment of an item must be impaired for a seizure 
to implicate the Fourth Amendment. Instead, in order to find a 
seizure, the Supreme Court only required that the government 
exercise dominion and control over an item, not that law en-
forcement impair the use or enjoyment of an item.
Both failures have their root in the same cause. Seizure, as 
applied to the Fourth Amendment, primarily revolves around 
the actual seizure of physical items.189 Where the actual sei-
zure of physical items is concerned, 
exercising “dominion and control” 
over an item and impairing the “use 
and enjoyment” of property are the 
same. For instance, when a law 
enforcement officer seizes white 
powder suspected to be a narcotic, 
he or she simultaneously exercises 
dominion and control over the pow-
der while denying its use and enjoy-
ment to its owner.
The digital age has confounded 
this fundamental conception of sei-
zure. Information previously stored 
physically in files and filing cabi-
nets is now stored electronically. 
Technology now enables the virtual 
seizure of virtual items. The seizure 
of a computer file does not deny its 
use or enjoyment to others, hence, 
virtual seizure.
The use of GPS devices does 
not go quite so far. Instead, the use 
of GPS devices constitutes the vir-
tual seizure (as use of the car is not 
denied to the owner) of physical property (the vehicle itself). 
Something intangible is taken from a vehicle’s owner when a 
GPS device is placed on it—liberty and privacy. In this way, 
the use of a GPS device is not unlike copyright and plagiarism. 
Copyright vests ownership in words; the words themselves be-
come property of their copyright owner. When the possessory 
interest in the copyright is violated, something intangible has 
been taken.190 Fortunately, the existing seizure jurisprudence is 
flexible enough to address the issues raised by GPS devices.
A. THERE IS A POSSESSORY INTEREST AT STAKE
First, the Court requires that a possessory interest be at 
stake. It should be manifestly clear that an individual has a pos-
sessory interest in his vehicle. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has indicated that the Fourth Amendment recognizes the virtual 
Even if an individual were 
to somehow divine a way 
to exhibit a subjective 
expectation of privacy 
in the movements of his 
automobile, the Court 
will struggle to identify a 
corresponding objective 
expectation as reflected  
in society.
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seizure of virtual items.191 A wiretap constitutes a virtual seizure 
(as the use of one’s voice is not denied to the individual) of a 
virtual item (one’s voice is not a physical object). Much like the 
CBS television crew in Ayendi I, GPS devices expose informa-
tion that individuals rightly wish to keep private. This informa-
tion includes religious affiliations, political leanings, and social 
relationships. As in Ayendi I, the use of GPS devices implicates 
the privacy of the individuals against whom it is used. In con-
junction with the possessory right, the owner has a cognizable 
privacy interest that is put at risk by the attachment of a GPS 
device. More importantly, law enforcement asserts dominion 
and control over a vehicle when they attach a GPS device to it.
B. THE GOVERNMENT EXERTS DOMINION AND  
 CONTROL OVER THE VEHICLE
After establishing that Fourth Amendment interests are 
at stake, the Court requires that the government interfere with 
those interests. With respect to their use of GPS devices, the 
government does so in two separate ways. First, as the Jacobsen 
Court explained, the government interferes with a possessory 
interest when it exerts dominion and control over it.192 As Ja-
cobsen illustrates, manipulation of an item constitutes dominion 
and control over it. Second, according to Va Lerie, the seizure 
standard prohibits the “government’s conversion of an individ-
ual’s private property.”193
1. The Attachment of a Foreign Object to One’s  
 Property Interferes with the Owner’s Basic  
 Possessory Rights
Ownership of “property implies the right of possession 
and control” including the “right to protect and defend such 
possession against the intrusion or trespass of others.”194 
The owner of property has the “right to exclude from it all the 
world, including the government, and a concomitant right to 
use it exclusively for his own purposes.”195 That right includes 
the prerogative to prohibit the attachment of foreign devices to 
one’s property. The attachment of a GPS device to a car by law 
enforcement officials defeats that basic right.
2. Attachment of a GPS Device Constitutes 
 Conversion
The intent to exercise dominion and control inconsistent 
with the owner’s rights differentiates conversion from tres-
pass.196 When the government attaches a GPS device to the car, 
governmental officials transform the car from a mode of trans-
portation into a messenger, conscripted into the ranks of the 
government. More than a mere trespass,197 the officials have 
moved the vehicle from its functional possession into the role 
of an informant for the police. The government infringes on the 
exclusionary property right by attaching an unwanted device 
to the vehicle. Contrary to the conclusory opinion in Karo, the 
attachment of a GPS device does not constitute pure trespass. 
It is a conversion of an individual’s car into a homing beacon, 
constantly announcing itself to law enforcement: I am here.198
The Second Restatement of Torts adds another element to 
the Eighth Circuit’s conception of conversion; the interfering 
actor “may justly be required to pay the other the full value of 
the chattel.”199 In order to determine the seriousness of the inter-
ference, the Second Restatement suggests looking to six factors:
1) the extent and duration of the actor’s exercise of do-
minion or control; 2) the actor’s intent to assert a right 
in fact inconsistent with the other’s right of control; 3) 
the actor’s good faith; 4) the extent and duration of the 
resulting interference with the other’s right of control; 
5) the harm done to the chattel; 6) the inconvenience 
and expense caused to the other.200
The first five of these factors cut in favor of conversion. The 
government’s dominion and control results in the interference 
with the owners’ right of control over the vehicle for an ex-
tended duration.201 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that law enforcement does indeed intend to assert a 
right inconsistent with the owners’ right of control when they 
attach objects to an individual’s vehicle.202 As for the sixth fac-
tor, there is economic harm done to the vehicle. There is little 
empirical research on the economic or market value of privacy, 
but the existing research suggests that privacy, especially infor-
mation privacy, does indeed have great value.203 For example, 
one may imagine an auction in which two vehicles, identical 
in all respects except one, are being sold. The only difference 
between the two is that one of the vehicles has a government-
monitored GPS device attached to it.204 It is difficult to imagine 
both selling for the same price. For some, a car equipped with a 
monitored GPS device would be worthless because of the value 
placed on privacy. The inconvenience and expense caused to the 
owner is debatable, but likely minimal.
C. BALANCING TEST
Under the definition articulated in the Court’s jurispru-
dence, this interference is not reasonable. The possessory inter-
ference is both highly intrusive and lengthy in duration. First, 
the owner of the vehicle has not diluted his possessory interest 
in his property by “relinquish[ing] control . . . to a third party”205 
as did Jacobsen when he gave his package to Federal Express.206 
Moreover, unlike the dog sniff in Chadwick, the intrusion of a 
GPS device exposes more than simply incriminating informa-
tion. It instead reveals an unparalleled amount of information 
about the target—both personal and mundane, private and pub-
lic. GPS devices enable the government to monitor an individ-
ual’s movements for twenty-four hours a day, and for weeks or 
months at a time. All movements are recorded; there is no filter 
for information relating solely to incriminating or explicit crimi-
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nal activity. Every move, every turn is recorded. Use of the GPS 
device perverts the fundamental concept of property, which 
vests in its owner the right to exclude all others from it. The use 
of a GPS device is somewhat like the deprivation of property 
in Jacobsen where the deprivation was permanent.207 The Court 
there found the scope of the intrusion to be trivial because only a 
trace amount of the powder was destroyed. Here, however, law 
enforcement is not taking a trace amount of the car, but rather 
converting the entire possession for their purposes.
As in Jacobsen, the intrusion imposed by a GPS device is 
extended in duration. Law enforcement can maintain their inter-
ference with an individual’s possessory interests in perpetuity. 
They use GPS devices to help gather evidence to solve crimes. 
One of two results is possible—either they solve the crime or 
they do not. If they solve the crime, either they have caught the 
individual they targeted with the GPS device (Targeted Person), 
or they caught someone else (Actual Culprit). Where the Actual 
Culprit is not the Targeted Person, law enforcement has no in-
centive to stop monitoring the Targeted Person. The device is 
a sunk cost, and they can continue to gather information to use 
retroactively should another crime be committed that they have 
difficulty solving. The next time they have a “whodunit” on 
their hands, they can simply access location information for all 
individuals they have subjected to GPS surveillance and hope 
for a positive match. In the third and final scenario, if law en-
forcement cannot solve the crime, the GPS device will live on 
indefinitely, constantly transmitting information that authorities 
hope will help them to solve the puzzle. In two out of these three 
plausible scenarios, use of the GPS device is not only indefinite, 
but also potentially permanent.
Finally, no interest of law enforcement supports the con-
tinuous, uninterrupted seizure of personal property. The only 
law enforcement interest at stake is that in preventing and inves-
tigating crime. This interest, however, does not justify twenty-
four hour seizure of an individual’s vehicle, particularly when 
the owner may not even be suspected of a crime.208 While law 
enforcement typically has a reason for following someone, they 
have not always acted so scrupulously. In New York, authori-
ties were unable to articulate their reason for following Mr. 
Weaver.209 In both Jacobsen and Terry, the ratio of government 
interest to intrusion was quite high. The Court was careful to 
note that the intrusion in both Terry and Jacobsen was low.210 
By contrast the governmental interests—preventing and detect-
ing crime and ensuring the safety of the officer in Terry—were 
quite high. Here however, the governmental interest, while 
somewhat strong, pales in comparison to the degree and length 
of intrusion of one’s possessory interests.
In sum, even without the added scrutiny invited by the 
implication of First Amendment concerns, the attachment of a 
GPS device constitutes the seizure of a car. Law enforcement 
meaningfully interferes with possessory interests by converting 
the nature of the automobile from a provider of transportation 
to a government informant. Additionally, law enforcement must 
exert dominion and control over the vehicle, thus violating the 
fundamental prerogative of the owner to exclude all others from 
his or her own property. This interference is both intrusive and 
constant. It provides a comprehensive dossier of a person’s in-
teractions, travels, and associates, and it does so without pause. 
The conversion is indefinite but likely extended in duration and 
potentially permanent. Finally, the governmental interest in pre-
venting and detecting crime does not balance out the intrusive-
ness and duration that renders the seizure unreasonable. The 
fact that the seizure implicates First Amendment concerns only 
strengthens this analysis.
VI. THE USE OF A GPS DEVICE SHOULD BE 
PREAUTHORIZED BY A WARRANT
The text of the Fourth Amendment does not mandate that 
law enforcement obtain a warrant before conducting a search or 
seizure. The Fourth Amendment requires only that “[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . .”211 Nevertheless, the Court has interpreted rea-
sonableness to require a warrant before law enforcement can 
conduct a search or seizure.212 In Johnson, the Court overturned 
an opium user’s convictions after law enforcement searched her 
room without a warrant. The Court did so despite conceding 
that the presence of an odor that law enforcement officials rec-
ognized as burning opium probably furnished the agents with 
probable cause. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the decision 
of whether information known to officers is sufficient to justify 
the intrusion of a defendant’s privacy is to be made by a judicial 
officer, not the police officer on the ground. The Court clarified 
that the Amendment’s protections do not “den[y] law enforce-
ment the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men 
draw from evidence.”213 Instead, the Court required “that those 
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate in-
stead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often com-
petitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”214
Therefore, a ruling that the use of GPS devices constitutes 
a Fourth Amendment seizure triggers the warrant requirement. 
While there are several “specifically established and well-de-
lineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement, none applies 
to the most common use of GPS devices.215 Some of the follow-
ing are exceptions that the Court has recognized: the presence 
of exigent circumstances such as the hot pursuit of a fleeing 
felon,216 investigating reasonably suspicious behavior and en-
suring officer safety,217 consent searches,218 searches conducted 
incident to a valid arrest,219 searches of automobiles,220 and 
searches of items in plain view.221 Each exception is informed 
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by a particular purpose. With respect to investigatory stops and 
frisks, the Court noted that officer safety was a critical basis for 
the exception but required that any search be limited to only that 
exploration necessary to discover weapons.222 Similarly, when 
discussing the exigent circumstances exception, the Court rea-
soned that such an exception exists to protect against the danger 
that evidence is destroyed or harm caused to the pursuing offi-
cers.223 In the case of GPS devices, there is little reason to create 
an exception to the warrant requirement. Law enforcement must 
already obtain and attach a GPS device. There is no reason they 
could not obtain a warrant as well. In short, law enforcement 
should be required to obtain a warrant before tracking suspects 
by attaching GPS devices to their vehicles.
VII. CONCLUSION
Jeremy Bentham described his panopticon as “a new mode 
of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto 
without example.”224 The use of GPS devices leverages tech-
nology to achieve the same result as a panopticon. The Weaver 
case aside, all indications are that law enforcement has been 
judicious in their deployment of GPS technology. Nevertheless, 
it defies logic to wait on the day that the Government “institute 
programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements”225 as 
Judge Posner suggests. The irony of Judge Posner’s statement 
is that like the prisoners in a panopticon, neither the American 
people nor the judicial system will be aware that law enforce-
ment is watching. In other words, there is little evidence to sug-
gest that the public would be aware of mass surveillance even if 
it were taking place. While it may be counter-intuitive to think 
of the attachment of a GPS device as a seizure rather than a 
search, the dissonance is a result of the evolution of the Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure doctrines. Under the prevailing 
interpretation of the seizure prong of the Fourth Amendment, 
the use of GPS devices constitutes a seizure, and law enforce-
ment should be required to obtain a warrant before using them. 
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(discussing Knotts and the Supreme Court’s decision that the beeper did 
not constitute a search, noting also that circuits split over the question 
whether installing the device constitutes a search).
71 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277-78 (1983) (referencing 
that at some point, the beeper signal was lost and was only rediscovered 
with the assistance of a helicopter).
72 See id. at 282 (emphasizing that the defendant in this case was driv-
ing on a public highway, he could be viewed entering his premises from 
the public highway, and he could be seen moving the chloroform drum in 
his open fields).
73 Id. at 281.
74 Hutchins, supra note 5, at 433.
75 See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27, 31-32 (2001) 
(discussing how the permissibility of “[v]isual surveillance was unques-
tionably lawful because ‘the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty 
of a trespass,’” but suggesting that this general permissibility is no longer 
so simple).
76 Id. at 35 n. 2.
77 See id. at 38 n. 5 (vindicating “imperceptibility” as the key ingredi-
ent to finding an extrasensory device because without such a device, the 
intimate activities within the home are imperceptible to police); see also 
Hutchins, supra note 5, at 437 n. 151 (noting that Kyllo observes that 
that the thermal imager detected “infrared radiation, which virtually all 
objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye” and disputes the 
dissent’s description of the thermal imager as a sense-augmenting device 
by noting that “on the night of January 16, 1992, no outside observer 
could have discerned the relative heat of Kyllo’s home without thermal 
imaging”).
78 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (insisting that 
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places); see also Kyllo, 533 
U.S. at 28, 35 (stating that any “mechanical interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment [was rejected] in Katz”).
79 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
80 Consider Smith which noted that a pen register revealed “[n]either the 
purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the 
call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed . . . .” Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. 
Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)).
81 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284.
82 Id. at 283.
83 See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986) 
(considering two aspects of the Fourth Amendment, including “whether 
the common-law ‘curtilage’ doctrine encompasses a large industrial 
complex such as Dow’s, and whether photography employing an aerial 
mapping camera is permissible in this context”).
84 Id. at 234.
85 See id. at 238 n. 5 (contending that small objects, such as of the size 
of a class ring, are not identifiable by the photographs, which does not 
“implicate more serious privacy concerns”).
86 Id. at 239.
87 Id. at 238 (noting that other technological surveillance may implicate 
the Fourth Amendment).
88 The Eighth Circuit also addressed this issue but found that the appel-
lant did not have standing to challenge the use of the GPS device. United 
States. v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding, however, 
that even if the appellant had standing, he would not have a Fourth 
Amendment claim because “[a] person traveling via automobile on public 
streets has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from 
one locale to another”).
89 See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting 
also that beeper technology was only a modest improvement over unaided 
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surveillance yet imagining a situation where police officers randomly at-
tach GPS devices to several cars and tracking them).
90 Id.
91 See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir. 
2010) (holding that no search was conducted on the defendant’s car 
despite a four-month long surveillance of the defendant’s car through 
mobile tracking devices).
92 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562-63 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(holding that when surveillance is prolonged, the recordings offer a bigger 
picture, revealing so much more information that “[a] reasonable person 
does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record of every time he 
drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and each place he 
stops and how long he stays there”).
93 This case involved an individual, William Bradley Jackson, who 
was suspected in of the disappearance of his daughter, Valiree. Jackson 
reported that Valiree was missing on the morning of October 18, 1999. 
After conducting an investigation of the home and Valiree’s bedroom, the 
police believed that Jackson may have been involved with his daughter’s 
disappearance and informed him of their suspicions.
94 Washington v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 222 (Wash. 2003).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 223-24 (concluding that the GPS was extrasensory because it 
provides a technological substitute for visual tracking).
98 909 N.E. 2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009).
99 Id. at 1196 (indicating that the record was unclear as to why the 
defendant was under surveillance).
100 See id. at 1199 (noting that, unlike a beeper, a GPS follows the 
target for multiple trips and is “exponentially more sophisticated and 
powerful . . . that is easily and cheaply deployed and has virtually  
unlimited and remarkably precise tracking capability”).
101 See, e.g., id. at 1200-01 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 
(1972) and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) as examples that a 
ride in a motor vehicle does not completely deprive its occupants of any 
reasonable expectation of privacy).
102 Id. at 1199.
103 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
104 See text accompanying infra note 180.
105 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560-561 (holding, however, that the actions 
of the target over time did not amount to constructive exposure because it 
is remote that any one person would constantly observe another individual 
for one month).
106 Id. at 561 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Free-
dom of Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989)).
107 Id.
108 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 n. 5 (1984) (refer-
encing how “[w]hile the concept of a ‘seizure’ of property is not much 
discussed in our cases, [t]his definition follows from our oft-repeated 
definition of the ‘seizure’ of a person”); see also United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696, 700-01 (1983) (recognizing that “in the context of personal 
property, and particularly containers, the Fourth Amendment challenge is 
typically to the subsequent search of the container rather than to its initial 
seizure by the authorities” (emphasis omitted)).
109 See Major Eric R. Carpenter, Seizures without Searches: Defining 
Property Seizures and Developing a Property Seizure Model, 42 GONZ. 
L. REV. 173, 173 (2007) (mentioning that many seizures are justified by 
the plain view doctrine, which often prevents courts from addressing this 
issue).
110 See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 (1983) (recognizing that “the 
Amendment protects two different interests of the citizen – the interest in 
retaining possession of property and the interest in maintaining personal 
privacy”); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (reiterating a person’s 
right to control his person without interference from others); see also 
Antonio Yanez Jr., Criminal Procedure: Ayeni v. Mottola and the Implica-
tions of Characterizing Videotaping as a Fourth Amendment Seizure, 61 
BROOK. L. REV. 507, 510 (1995) (referencing cases that “proclaim[] that 
privacy, liberty and property, respectively, were the central focus of the 
Fourth Amendment”).
111 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (differentiating between a search, 
which “occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
consider reasonable is infringed,” and a seizure of property which “occurs 
when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s posses-
sory interests in that property”).
112 Id.
113 See Ohm, supra note 16, at 85 (referring to search and seizure as 
“cohabitant values in the Fourth Amendment”).
114 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708-09 (1983) (analogizing an 
investigative seizure of the defendant’s luggage to a Terry stop and there-
fore limiting the scope of a permissible seizure to that of an investigative 
Terry search).
115 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
116 See id. at 111, 113 (explicating that although the FedEx employee’s 
cut open the package, perhaps without a good reason, the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment right was not violated because it was not a govern-
mental action).
117 Id. at 111-12.
118 Id. at 112.
119 See id. at 122-23 (opining that because the private Federal Express 
employee had already opened the package and had told the agents the 
contents, the court did not find any of the other aspects to be a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment).
120 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708-09 (1983) (noting that these 
interests are of particular importance when transporting luggage).
121 Id. at 708 (reiterating that the analysis used here is similar to that of 
a Terry stop, the limits of which the Court found were exceeded in this 
exercise of government action).
122 Ohm, supra note 16, at 2-5 (explaining that the Court consistently 
interprets the seizure clause to protect “only physical property rights and 
to regulate only the deprivation of tangible things”).
123 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56-57 (1967) (discussing cases 
where recordings were considered an invasion of privacy but permis-
sible under the Fourth Amendment because the government had secured 
judicial approval).
124 See id. at 59 (holding that wiretaps are the equivalent of eavesdrop-
ping, and therefore “the statute’s failure to describe with particularity the 
conversations sought gives the officer a roving commission to ‘seize’ any 
and all conversations”); see also Ohm, supra note 16, at 18 (declaring that 
wiretaps are both searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment).
125 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
126 Id.; Professor Ohm discredits the argument that the Court “was 
speaking about the Fourth Amendment writ large, without focusing on 
a search and seizure as two separate acts” by juxtaposing the majority 
opinions in Berger and Katz with Justice Black’s dissenting opinions in 
those respective cases which “specifically raise arguments against finding 
these acts to be seizure.” See Ohm, supra note 16, at 20.
127 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 688-90 (2nd Cir. 1994) (Ayeni I) (not-
ing, however, that obtaining a photograph for the purpose of simple iden-
tification may not be a seizure); United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 
1334-35 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding that taking photographs without 
seizing intangible property can be analogized to seizing a person’s conver-
sations, which implicates the Fourth Amendment); Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 848 
F. Supp. 362, 367-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (Ayeni II) (allowing a camera crew 
to view a search implicated the Fourth Amendment despite its intangible 
nature); United States v. Johnson, 452 F.2d 1363, 1371-72 (D.C. Cir. 
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1971) (remanding the case to determine whether taking a photograph of a 
suspect without probable cause to arrest is a search and seizure); but see 
Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 707 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that taking 
photographs does not constitute a seizure because photographs were taken 
in plain view of the area).
128 Ayeni I, 35 F.3d at 683.
129 Id. at 688 (quotes omitted).
130 Ohm, supra note 16, at 2 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment 
protects tangible items).
131 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1984).
132 Id. at 124-25 (explaining that destroying the powder made deprivation 
of property interest permanent); see Carpenter, supra note 108, at 188 
(elaborating that a seizure occurred when there was meaningful govern-
ment interference with possessory interest).
133 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983) (noting that 
the Court has “never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 
90-minute period involved here”).
134 United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 702 (8th Cir. 2005) (emphasis 
added).
135 Id. at 703.
136 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124-25 (citations omitted).
137 Indeed the Court stated that it would have been poor police work if 
the observing officer had not stopped the defendant to investigate further. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1968).
138 Id. at 10, 17.
139 Id. at 30 (discussing how the police officers refrained from an explor-
atory search, limiting the scope to a patdown to secure any weapons).
140 Id. (the limiting language used by the Court states “where a police 
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude 
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the 
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, 
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as 
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the ini-
tial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own 
or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in 
the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such 
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault 
him”).
141 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983).
142 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984).
143 Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 708.
146 Id. at 705-06.
147 See id. at 709-10 (recognizing the Court has never condoned a seizure 
of ninety minutes under these circumstances).
148 United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970) (elaborating 
that “on the facts of this case . . . that there were two packages going to 
separate destinations, the unavoidable delay in contacting the more distant 
of the two destinations, the distance between Mt. Vernon and Seattle — a 
29-hour delay between the mailings and the service of the warrant cannot 
be said to be ‘unreasonable’”).
149 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124-25 (1984) (converting 
the “deprivation of property” from temporary to permanent).
150 See id. at 125 (explaining that law enforcement took only a trace 
amount of the powder, and the defendants conceded they would not have 
noticed the missing powder).
151 Indeed, it seems as if individuals are identifiable just by looking at 
their search history. See Katie Hafner, Researchers Yearn to Use AOL 
Logs But They Hesitate, N.Y. Times, Aug 23, 2006, http://www.nytimes.
com/2006/08/23/technology/23search.html?ex=1313985600&en=cc878
412ed34dad0&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (mentioning that AOL 
posted enough information about its users that someone could identify 
these users).
152 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
153 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (balancing potential 
deterrent or unintended consequences against government regulation of 
industries).
154 Id.
155 U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622.
156 Id. at 618.
157 Id. at 619.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 622-23 (listing, for example, that the government may take 
action to impose penalties or withhold benefits to members of a disfa-
vored group, require disclosure of fact of membership in a group seeking 
anonymity, or interfere with internal affairs of a group).
160 Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468 (1985) (contending that “[t]he 
First Amendment imposes special constraints on searches for and seizures 
of presumptively protected material, and requires that the Fourth Amend-
ment be applied with ‘scrupulous exactitude’ in such circumstances”) 
(citations and emphasis omitted).
161 Id. at 468-69 (holding that “[a]bsent some action taken by govern-
ment agents that can properly be classified as a ‘search’ or ‘seizure,’ 
the Fourth Amendment rules designed to safeguard First Amendment 
freedoms do not apply”) (citations and emphasis omitted).
162 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1965) (noting that “un-
restricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for 
stifling liberty of expression”) (citation omitted).
163 Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 491 (1973).
164 In this assessment, the author assumes a typical fact pattern. There 
are many variations, but in general, the police suspect an individual of 
wrongdoing. The police then attach a GPS device to his vehicle when it 
is parked on public property. The police then either remotely track the ve-
hicle or periodically download the information stored on the GPS device.
165 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1983); but see United 
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (ignoring the language 
in Knotts explicitly limiting the holding to situations that do not involve 
twenty-four hour surveillance of individuals, while focusing on the lan-
guage prohibiting dragnet procedures).
166 Marco Polo is a children’s game that takes place in a swimming pool. 
One player (the searcher), keeping his or her eyes closed, must try to tag 
the other players. The searcher can only sense where the other players 
are by sound, calling out “Marco!” The other players must respond with 
“Polo!” In this way, the searcher tries to follow the sounds to tag any of 
the other players.
167 For a comprehensive technical discussion of GPS technology, see 
Hutchins, supra note 5, at 414.
168 See New York v. Weaver, 909 N.E. 2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (rec-
ognizing that “constant, relentless tracking of anything is now not merely 
possible but entirely practicable” using GPS devices); see Washington v. 
Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003) (“However, when a GPS device 
is attached to a vehicle, law enforcement officers do not in fact follow the 
vehicle. Thus, unlike binoculars or a flashlight, the GPS device does not 
merely augment the officers’ senses, but rather provides a technological 
substitute for traditional visual tracking.”).
169 See, e.g., Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1200 (illustrating that the authori-
ties could not articulate any reason they had attached a GPS device to 
Weaver’s car, forcing courts to address GPS technology under judicial 
supervision).
170 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
171 See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009) (finding that 
the “privacy interest in [one’s] vehicle [while] less substantial than in 
his home . . . is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional 
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protection”) (citations omitted); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 
(1979) (“An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not 
lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile 
and its use are subject to government regulation . . . Were the individual 
subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an 
automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be 
seriously circumscribed.”); but see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 
(1974) (“The search of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights 
protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one’s person or of 
a building.”).
172 See, e.g., Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 592 (holding a “warrantless examina-
tion” of a vehicle’s exterior does not violate the Fourth Amendment); see 
also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) (“Besides the 
element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because 
the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly 
less than that relating to one’s home or office.”).
173 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (explaining that 
“[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another”).
174 Brenner, supra note 11, at 28 (discussing caselaw that holds a person 
driving a vehicle acknowledged to the public on which roads the person 
drove, which turns the person made, and where the person ended).
175 “Moreover, because of the passive nature of the system, the govern-
ment can easily monitor the comings and goings of an entire family or a 
group of associates. Moreover, many GPS-enhanced surveillance systems 
retain records that can be reviewed and compared months or even years 
later. Accordingly, information about networks of people and associa-
tions can be developed, retained, and closely analyzed. The police could 
conclusively determine that every Monday I meet Diane and Kris for 
yoga, but on Tuesdays, Kris goes out with Roderick and Ray, while I work 
late. Or, that for the month of May, I frequently stopped by Julie’s Tattoo 
Parlor before stopping at Jay and Kurt’s apartment. They could generate 
and compare such records for weeks or months at a time to develop a 
comprehensive digest of my friends, associates, preferences, and desires.” 
Hutchins, supra note 5, at 458.
176 Id. at 450. “More importantly, nothing is lost by conceding, at least 
for the purpose of assessing intrusiveness within the existing analytical 
framework, that the type of information revealed by GPS-enhanced track-
ing places the technology in the sense-augmenting category.” Id.
177 See, e.g., New York v. Weaver, 909 N.E. 2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) 
(holding that a “GPS is not a mere enhancement of human sensory capac-
ity, it facilitates a new technological perception of the world in which 
the situation of any object may be followed and exhaustively recorded”); 
Oregon v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1048-49 (Or. 1988) (holding use 
of a radio transmitter is a search because it did not augment vision, and 
enabled police to find evidence they could not have found through visual 
surveillance); Washington v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 231 (Wash. 2003) 
(holding that placement of GPS device is a search as it does not augment 
senses, but instead provides technological substitute).
178 See Hutchins, supra note 5, at 450 (conceding that GPS devices are 
sense augmenting devices, while arguing that use of such devices consti-
tutes a search because 24-hour surveillance is extraordinarily difficult).
179 In both Knotts and Karo, the fact that the police could not at all times 
follow the car was irrelevant to the Court. The Court focused on whether 
it was theoretically possible for them to do so. Use of the beeper was 
essential in that case because it was not feasible, given the terrain, the 
length of the journey, and the possibility of discovery were closer tailing 
attempted, for the police to keep track of the suspect’s peregrinations with 
only visual surveillance. Yet a look at the facts in Karo strongly suggests 
that what the Court there characterized as a search uncovered a fact—that 
the can was presently within the home—which could have otherwise been 
discovered (at least in the sense of the unrealistic approach followed in 
Knotts). Agents saw the vehicle known to be carrying the container come 
to the house for which they later obtained a warrant, and the agents also 
saw that vehicle depart later. What they did not see, however, was whether 
the can with the beeper was still in the rear bed of the pickup truck, ap-
parently because (as the Court noted) “the agents did not maintain tight 
surveillance for fear of detection.” United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 
709 (1984).
180 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).
181 See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 228, 238 
(1986) (conceding that “surveillance of private property by using highly 
sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, 
such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent 
a warrant” while finding that “the photographs [in the case] were not so 
revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns”).
182 GPS Augmentations, GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM, http://www.gps.
gov/systems/augmentations/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
183 Hutchins, supra note 5, at 459.
184 See Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997 (recognizing that the “meaning of a 
Fourth Amendment search must change to keep pace with the march with 
science,” such as with thermal imaging).
185 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984) (discussing the 
slippery slope that “if the presence of a beeper in the can constituted a 
seizure merely because of its occupation of space, it would follow that the 
presence of any object, regardless of its nature, would violate the Fourth 
Amendment”).
186 See id. at 729 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (focusing on the prop-
erty owner’s right to exclude others from use of the property and consid-
ering the attachment of a GPS device as an “invasion” of those possessory 
rights).
187 Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996.
188 See supra Part III.C.1.i (discussing how a possessory interest is re-
quired for the Fourth Amendment to apply to both tangible and intangible 
items).
189 See Ohm, supra note 16, at 2 (mentioning that the Olmstead theory 
protected “physical property rights” and only tangible items).
190 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media uses Technology and 
the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity, 64 (2004) (assert-
ing that in establishing patent and copyright laws as an exception to the 
concept that “ideas released into the world are free [and] [t]he law turns 
the intangible into property”).
191 See supra Part III.C.1.i (arguing that wiretaps and other interceptions 
of communications can be seized).
192 See supra Part III.C.2 (contending that dominion and control are 
required to implicate the Fourth Amendment against the government).
193 United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 702 (8th Cir. 2005).
194 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 27 (2010); see Polytechnic Data Corp. v. 
Xerox Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1, 10 (N.D.Ill. 1973) (stating that the owner of 
property has “an absolute property right therein . . . includ[ing] a right to 
prohibit the attachment of devices thereto, or to retain authority to decide 
whether such attachment shall be made”).
195 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing in part).
196 See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 703 (discussing that the required intent of 
conversion is the intent to affect the chattel, not necessarily intentional 
wrongdoing).
197 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 712-13 (distinguishing trespass from seizure 
and comparing cases, such as Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), 
where there was no trespass, but a Fourth Amendment violation, and 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), where there was trespass, 
but no Fourth Amendment violation).
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198 See United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977) (finding 
that the placement of a beeper in a vehicle is an intrusion because “while 
a driver has no claim to be free from observation while driving in public, 
he properly can expect not to be carrying around an uninvited device that 
continuously signals his presence”).
199 Restatement (Second) on Torts § 222A (2010).
200 Id.
201 See infra Part V.C (arguing that an individual has a possessory interest 
in his vehicle, which is not eliminated by driving in public).
202 Karo, 468 U.S. at 712-13 (finding that attachment of a beeper may be 
is equivalent to a technical trespass for the space occupied by the beeper.).
203 See Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 COMM. OF THE ACM 
92, 96 (Sept. 1996) (demonstrating that there is already “a lively market 
in the U.S. for personal information” which is a “valuable asset to private 
and governmental institutions.”); see generally Il-Horn Hann, Kai-Lung 
Hui, Tom S. Lee, I.P.L. Png, The Value of Online Information Privacy: 
An Empirical Investigation, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY 
STUDIES 11-14 (Oct. 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=391993 
(quantifying the value of privacy protection).
204 Assuming, of course, that the GPS device cannot be removed or 
disabled.
205 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983).
206 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984) (discussing that 
the government’s dominion and control over the package did not consti-
tute an unreasonable seizure of the item).
207 See id. at 125 n. 27 (finding that while permanent, the law enforce-
ment’s actions did not effectuate a seizure because the officers seized only 
a “trace amount”).
208 See New York v. Weaver, 909 N.E. 2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y. 2009) (refer-
encing that the record was devoid of a reason the “defendant was placed 
under electronic surveillance”).
209 Id.
210 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125 (illustrating that intrusion was low 
“because only a trace amount of material was involved, the loss of which 
appears to have gone unnoticed by respondents”); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 
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